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appeal, review the evidence and to make its own findings of fact if
it is convinced that the interests of justice so require it.
Furthermore, the appellate court may disturb the trial judge's
factual findings if it feels he has misapplied the law so that an
injustice has resulted.
1981).

Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah

Also, the Court may disturb the Findings of Fact if it

"reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made."

Western Capital and Securities v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989,

991 (Utah. App. 1989).

See also. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191

(Utah, 1987).
At no point in its Opinion does this Court reject the trial
court's factual findings.

In fact the Court's Opinion clearly

demonstrates an exhaustive review of the evidence and the Findings
of Fact.
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This Court, on page 3 of its Opinion, stated in

footnote 3:
Plaintiff questions the trial court's finding
that the three appraisals to which Carol Klas
referred
ranged
from
$175,000.00
to
$192,000.00. It is clear from the record that
both Carol Klas and Mark Van Wagoner
understood the range of those appraisals to
begin at $170,000.00, not $175,000.00. Thus,
we conclude that the trial court's finding
that the three appraisals ranged from
$175,000.00 and up was clearly erroneous.
Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah. App.
1989). (emphasis added)
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unconscionability of a contract or a clause therein is a matter of
law and not a question of fact.
302(1), 1953 as amended.

Utah Code Annotated, §70A-2-

See also, Annot. 18 A.L.R. 3d 1305. The

finding that the difference in value was material to the Defendants
was not changed or challenged by this Court.

However, a ruling

that the difference was not "unconscionable" as a matter of law was
clearly a matter for this Court to decide on appeal.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT RETROACTIVELY APPLY A NEW STANDARD
FOR UNILATERAL MISTAKE AS IT PERTAINS TO THIS CASE.
The Appellees in Point III of their Petition for Rehearing
raise a novel argument and suggest that this Court should not
retroactively apply a "new standard" for unilateral mistake.

The

trial of this cause was concluded on the 12th day of May, 1989 and
the Memorandum Decision of the trial court rendered in favor of the
Plaintiff on May 30, 1989.
The case of Guardian State Bank v. Stanql, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah,
1989) was decided by the Utah Supreme Court on July 13, 1989,
approximately one and one-half months after the trial court's
Memorandum Decision.

According to the Defendants, the trial

court's Memorandum Decision of May 30, 1989 should have applied the
law existing on that date and any retroactive application of a "new
standard" after that date would be improper.

Nevertheless, the

Defendants learned of the Stanql case, at which point they then
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POINT II 1
THE STANDARD APPLIED IN THE COURT'S OPINION IS
THE SAME ESTABLISHED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
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ignored the basis for this Court's thorough and well reasoned
opinion.
The four factors referred to in the case of Grahn v. Gregory,
800 P.2d 320 (Ut. App. 1990) and applied in this
are not a new creation

by this Court.

Court's Opinion

They were clearly

established and spelled out by the Utah Supreme Court in the 1987
case of John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205,
1209 (Utah 1987) which cited even earlier cases including Briggs v.
Liddell, 699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985). The four elements of relief for
unilateral mistake contained in this Court's Opinion are taken from
these earlier Utah Supreme Court cases and are used as the basis
for that Opinion.

This Plaintiff cannot find and Defendants have

not cited any authority which hold that this standard has been
changed, overruled or modified in any way.
In its decision in Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 78 P.2d 1
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court did not establish a "new
standard"

for

unilateral

mistake.

It

simply

discussed

the

evolution of the doctrine of unilateral mistake and serves to
clarify the existing law.

In Stangl the Court acknowledged that

some of its prior decisions had led to a misunderstanding that
relief was available

only

for mutual mistake.

However, it

clarified its position on this issue recognizing that relief may be
granted on the basis of unilateral mistake. Id. at 5. At no point
did it overrule its prior decisions in John Call Engineering or
Briggs, supra or rule that the standard set forth in those cases

1
was erroneous.
This Court specifically cited Stangl acknowledging it as a
discussion of the doctrine of unilateral mistake.

It did not

attempt to set forth a new standard or supplant an existing one.
It specifically relied upon the controlling standard handed down by
our Supreme Court.
POINT IV
COURT MUST GIVE EFFECT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
In Stangl, supra at 6, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In its most simple and most straightforward
sense, the law really only enforces the intent
of the parties as to the fundamental agreement
between them;
In the present case, both Defendants were fully aware that
Plaintiff would only accept an offer within the range of $170,000
to $192,000 and on the condition that there be no contingencies,
exceptions, or

conditions.

The

Defendants

agreed

to those

provisions and even prepared the Agreement to be used.

There was

no provision conditioning the Agreement on the production of
written appraisals by the Plaintiff. The written Agreement speaks
for itself and spells out the intent of the parties which should be
given effect.
In their Petition, the Defendants state that the knowledge of
Mark Van Wagoner as an attorney, is somehow being imputed to
Kathryn Van Wagoner.

Such is not the case. Kathryn Van Wagoner,

as a signatory to the contract, is simply being bound by its terms

8
and provisions and charged with the knowledge of its contents which
are very clear and straightforward.

Any argument that she should

somehow be relieved of liability because she did not have the
knowledge of an attorney is without any basis.
In John Call Engineering, cited supra, at 1207-1208, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Generally, one party to an agreement does not
have a duty to ensure that the other party has
a complete and accurate understanding of all
terms embodied in a written contract. Rather,
each party has the burden to read and
understand the terms of a contract before he
or she affixes his or her signature to it. A
party may not sign a contract and thereafter
assert ignorance or failure to read the
contract as a defense. This rule is based
upon the panoply of contract law upholding the
principle that a party is bound by the
contract which he or she voluntarily and
knowingly signs. (emphasis added)
Kathryn Van Wagoner had ample opportunity to review the
Agreement and discuss its contents with her husband before signing
it. She certainly could have consulted with her husband and relied
on his expert legal advice before affixing her signature to the
Agreement.

Nevertheless, she is charged with knowledge of its

contents and should be bound thereby.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the issues raised by
the

Defendant's

Petition

for Rehearing

briefed, argued and reviewed by this Court.
clearly addresses

the main

have been

thoroughly

This Court's Opinion

issue on appeal and applies the
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applicable standard of review in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions.
The Court has not embarked on any fact finding beyond that
which it is empowered to do.

It has, in fact, adopted the trial

court's finding of fact but ruled that the application of the law
to these facts was incorrect.
The law which was applied was not a new standard but rather
the prevailing rule promulgated by our Supreme Court in several
prior cases.

Stanal is not a new standard for unilateral mistake

and was not supplanted or ignored by this Court.
Finally, the Court must give effect to the Agreement signed by
both Defendants who should both he charged with knowledge of its
contents.
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that
Defendants'

Petition

for

Rehearing

be

denied

and

that

the

provisions of this Court's Opinion and Order be enforced.
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